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Introduction 
 
Since the late 19th century, the presence of an independent and meritocratic bureaucracy has been 
posited as an advantage for effective bureaucratic behavior and a means of limiting patrimonial 
networks and corruption, among other benefits (Northcote and Trevelyan 1853; Wilson 1887). In 
his influential writings, Max Weber (1978 [1922]) argued that the bureaucratic organization, based 
on merit principles, was a superior form of organization which, in addition to other things, contrib-
utes to economic development. These suggestions have informed debates in political science, soci-
ology and economics ever since, and modern day studies have often confirmed the original ideas 
(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012; Evans and Rauch 1999; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; 
Horn 1995; Miller 2000; Peters and Pierre 2001). 
 
There is little consensus on how the features of an independent and meritocratic bureaucracy 
should be measured across countries, however, and broad empirical studies are therefore rare. The 
few such studies that exist have advanced measures that focus on certain aspects of meritocratic 
practices such as hiring, predictable long-term employment, time horizons and relatively high sala-
ries, always on the country level. They are also constructed exclusively on expert surveys (Dahl-
ström et al. 2015; Evans and Rauch 1999; Teorell, Dahlström and Dahlberg 2011). Although these 
have indeed contributed to the knowledge in the field, the data on which they are built come with 
some problems. First, even though expert assessments are sometimes the only way to learn about 
complex variables, and are therefore valuable tools, they are far from perfect. Probably everyone 
would agree that more direct, experienced based measures are preferable. Second, even when we 
talk about national bureaucracies in centralized countries, there are remarkable differences within 
countries in how institutions perform de facto and in policy outcomes (Charron and Lapuente 
2013; Charron, Dijsktra and Lapuente 2014; Tabellini 2008). Country means naturally miss this 
variation and therefore introduce what Stein Rokkan (1970) called a “whole-nation-bias” into com-
parative studies. Third, as Olsen (2005) remarks, there are many aspects of a Weberian bureaucracy 
that do not pull in the same direction. Aggregating different aspects of it—for example into a “We-
berianess scale” (Evans and Rauch 1999, 755)—might therefore bias conclusions.  
 
Here we propose a set of novel measures that complement existing measures in all these three as-
pects and thus fill important gaps in this burgeoning literature. The measures we present are not 
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based on expert assessments but on public sector employees’ experience and citizens’ perceptions. 
We create two measures—that can be combined into one—from a recent survey (2013) of over 
85,000 citizens in 24 European countries. One taps directly into public sector employees’ experi-
ences and asks whether they think success in the public sector is based on merit or on connections 
and luck. The other is based on perceptions of citizens working outside the public sector. In order 
not to have to trust country means, we follow Snyder’s (2001) suggestion and explore within coun-
try variation at the sub-national level that allows scholars to test causal inferences within countries, 
which constitutes a new level of analysis in this field. To capture this, the survey offers a sample of 
over 400 respondents in 212 regions in the 24 European countries included, which makes it possi-
ble for us also to explore spatial variations in bureaucratic meritocracy within countries. We are 
therefore able to offer the first indicator of regional level experiences and perceptions of the extent 
to which the public sector is meritocratic, together with aggregated cross-country measures. Finally, 
we follow Evans and Rauch (1999) and study the personnel side, because it is arguably the most 
important side of an independent and meritocratic bureaucracy. However, in contrast to previous 
measures that focus on the de jure rules (salaries, hiring practices etc.), we capture more closely the 
de facto side—whether success in the public sector is based on merit, according to current employees 
(experiences) and citizens who are both potential employees and users (perceptions).  
 
The rest of this paper discusses the survey in general and the questions employed to build our two 
measures. We use the experienced based measure to map meritocracy in Europe. Later, we explore 
the external validity of the measures provided here, showing correlations with alternative measures 
based on expert opinions, as well as standard variables from the literature that we would expect to 
correlate highly with a meritocratic bureaucracy, such as GDP per capita, corruption, bureaucratic 
effectiveness, rule of law, human development (HDI), measures of inequality (income and gender) 
and social trust. We find that when we aggregate the measures to the national level, they correlate 
strikingly highly with alternative, expert-based survey data, along with measures of economic and 
social development, which lends credibility to the sub-national indicator. The measure at the sub-
national level correlates highly with past measures of petty corruption (percentage of reported brib-
ery), the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014) 
and several similar indices of social and economic development and social trust. Thus, despite cap-
turing this concept from a different direction, previous measures based on formal/expert assess-
ments are in strong agreement with our informal/citizen experience-based measure. We finally look 
at the extent to which meritocracy varies spatially within countries. We ask whether this variation is 
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meaningful and try to answer by means of correlating it with Kuznets’ curve of economic devel-
opment (1956), openness to trade, length of European Union membership and political and fiscal 
decentralization. Our measure correlates as expected, which is an indication that the variation it is 
picking up is not only random.  
 
Measuring Meritocracy in the Public Sector: a Review of Existing 
Measures 
 
Contrary to the case in economics and political science, for example, public administration has seen 
few broad comparisons because the lack of data. While we know relatively much about the impact 
of political regimes, types of elites, openness and media freedom on for example corruption 
(Treisman 2007) and economic growth (Person and Tabellini 2003), the lack of data on bureaucra-
cies has hampered our understanding of the effects of bureaucratic structures, although there is 
good reason to believe that how bureaucracies are organized is very important. There are indeed 
several case comparisons (e.g. Silberman 1993), edited volumes with comparable case studies (e.g. 
Peters and Pierre 2004) and studies on single countries (e.g. Lewis 2008) that make it safe to con-
clude that how the bureaucracy is organized, generally, and the level of meritocracy, specifically, are 
central to bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, but we don’t know how important it is com-
pared to other factors, or whether effects are similar across the globe. For that we would need data 
that are difficult to find.  
 
To our knowledge there are only two datasets where the structure of bureaucracy is measured in a 
broad set of countries. The first is Peter Evans and James Rauch’s pioneering work (Evans and 
Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000) that covers 35 developing or semi-industrialized countries and 
focuses on the period from 1970-1990. While it provides important insight into the bureaucratic 
structures of a particular group of countries that experienced unprecedented growth rates with the 
help of autonomous bureaucracies (such as Spain, South Korea and other Asian “Tigers”), it re-
mains unclear whether the same results hold for other parts of the world. The second broad dataset 
is newer, includes more countries, and is collected by the Quality of Government Institute on two 
different occasions (Dahlström et al. 2015; Teorell, Dahlström and Dahlberg 2011). Based on these 
two datasets, the impact of bureaucratic structures, such as meritocratic recruitment to the public 
sector, is shown to have a surprisingly large impact on corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente and Te-
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orell 2012; Rauch and Evans 2000), economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999), poverty reduction 
(Henderson et al. 2007) and effectiveness and reform capacity (Dahlström and Lapuente 2014). 
As mentioned in the introduction, these datasets are limited as they are based on expert assess-
ments, are thus perception based, and are only available on the national level, even though there 
might be a great deal of sub-national variation. Although both datasets have produced valuable 
results, there is very much room for improvement. 
 
Measuring Public Sector Meritocracy ‘from Below’: A Citizen Experi-
ence Index 
 
Meritocracy in the public sector 
 
According to Evans and Rauch (1999), meritocracy in the public sector is mostly a product of two 
factors. The first is the weight put on education and examination when a public employee is hired, 
and the basic question of the grounds on which the employee is hired is a powerful signal of whom 
she owes her loyalty: to her peers, the Corps or the ruling party. The dividing line goes between 
systems that appreciate education and talent, on the one hand, and systems in which strong ties 
with the hiring part are pivotal, on the other. 
 
However, although the signal given when recruiting public employees is important, it is not the only 
way that public employees learn what is appreciated. The second factor, claimed by Evans and 
Rauch (1999), therefore concerns what makes the rest of the career successful for a public employ-
ee. In a Weberian understanding of meritocracy (Weber [1922] 1978), predictable careers and long-
term employment are important for creating a working environment in which meritocracy is re-
warded. Appreciating hard work or appreciating connections gives rise to two rather different sys-
tems of governance.  
 
We will try in this paper to measure the de facto level of meritocracy in a bureaucracy. As we will 
describe in more detail below, we use a different strategy than previous studies: we will not try to 
observe institutions and routines that are supposed to contribute to meritocracy but rather try to 
measure it directly. 
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The European Quality of Government Survey 2013  
 
Our measure uses several survey questions from the latest round of the survey, which is funded by 
the European Commission’s Seventh Annual Framework (Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 2013) 
and is intended to track citizen experiences and perceptions of “quality of government” (QoG) in 
the public sector. The survey was started in February, 2013, and was conducted in the local majority 
language in each country/region. It included 24 questions on the quality of institutions as well as 
demographic questions about the respondents. The results were returned to the Quality of Gov-
ernment Institute (Sweden) in April, 2013. 
 
The large international survey was conducted via telephone interviews, each of approximately ten 
minutes in length, during which 32 questions were posed. The total sample of respondents was 
over 85,000 individuals across Europe. The focus of the data is the regional level and the survey 
selectively sampled over 400 respondents per region. The sample size per country thus varies de-
pending on the number of regions. The regional level for each country in the survey is based on the 
European Union’s NUTS statistical regional level1. The NUTS level for each country was selected 
according to two factors—the extent to which elected political authorities have administrative, 
fiscal or political control over one or more of the public services in either health, education or law 
enforcement, and the price for conducting the survey. In direct consultation with the EU Commis-
sion, the NUTS 1 and 2 regions were selected on these bases2. 
 
As a consequence of this dissension, one issue that must be dealt with is that the regions we are 
targeting in some countries—such as Germany, Belgium, Italy or Spain—are both politically and 
administratively meaningful, while others are less so. This is to say that their local constituents elect 
these regional governments, have their own autonomous revenues (either from directly taxing citi-
zens or central government transfers or both) and a degree of autonomy with which to redistribute 
resources in the form of public services.  In more politically centralized countries, such as Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia or Portugal, this issue becomes more challenging. The regions of our focus 
(NUTS 1 or NUTS 2), while meaningful in the sense that EU development funds are targeted di-
rectly to them and that Eurostat reports annual data on them, have in some cases been mainly an 
                                                     
1
 NUTS stands for ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’ and is made up of statistical regions for the EU and 
other European countries.  For further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview  
2
 The sample of countries and corresponding NUTs level and regions is reported in Appendix 1. 
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invention for EU statistical purposes, and are not politically meaningful. For this reason, asking a 
respondent in some cases whether most people in the public sector “can succeed if they are willing 
to work hard” in your region might be a bit confusing, since respondents from countries such as 
Hungary or Romania might not recognize that they are even living in that region. 
 
It can therefore be argued that the administrative and political responsibility of the NUTS regions 
varies too much in different countries and thus poses a problem in analysing these data. We recog-
nise this problem and therefore include a variable identifying the politically relevant regions, which 
makes it possible for anyone to take this issue into account. We would however argue against gen-
erally dropping the regions from the centralized countries as we attempt to capture all regional 
variation within a country and, as several other scholars have noted (e.g. Tabellini 2008), there are 
numerous empirical indications and anecdotal evidence pointing out that provision, quality of pub-
lic services, and informal rules in countries with powerful central governments can nonetheless vary 
greatly across different regions. 
 
Thus, to synthesize the survey and make the results as comparable between and within countries as 
possible, we ask respondents questions that focus on de facto meritocracy and other concepts that 
the survey is trying to capture in their area. 
 
In order to build the indictor of meritocracy discussed in this paper, we employ the following sur-
vey question: 
 
“Which statement comes closer to your own views?  1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; if your 
views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number between 1 and 10: 
1 (In the public sector most people can succeed if they are willing to work hard)  
10 (Hard work is no guarantee of success in the public sector for most people—it’s more a 
matter of luck and connections)”  
 
As we have indicated, we build two different measures from this question. The first is more experi-
ence based, and the second is based on perceptions. To separate between experience- based and 
perception-based responses, we thus take a second step and draw from the following question: 
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“As far as your current occupation is concerned, would you say you work in the public sec-
tor (a public sector organization is either wholly owned by the public authorities or they have 
a majority share), the private sector or would you say that you are without a professional ac-
tivity? 
PUBLIC SECTOR (Military / Soldier; Law enforcement/ police/ fire-fighter; Health care 
worker/ doctor; Teacher, Academic, researcher; Other government agency) 
PRIVATE SECTOR (Self-employed / small business owner/ Freelancer; Other private sec-
tor employee) 
WITHOUT A PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY (Currently unemployed; Housewife / 
Houseman; Pensioner, retired; Pupil / Student / Trainee; Other)” 
 
We record whether respondents answered that they were employed in the first five categories 
(“public sector”) as an answer based on experiences, while all other professions fell under percep-
tions of public sector meritocracy. Of the over 85,000 respondents, roughly 30 percent work in the 
public sector in some capacity while, consequently, 70 percent do not. 
 
This gives us two different measures of meritocracy in the public sector. In the final step, we aggre-
gate these answers, either to the regional (NUTS 1 or 2) or to the national level. Figure 1 shows the 
roadmap used in this paper to build the sub-national and national level indictors from the survey 
data. 
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FIGURE 1, ROADMAP FOR SUB-NATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL INDICTORS (EXPERIENCES 
AND PERCEPTIONS) 
 
 
Comment: Based on the European Quality of Government survey 2013, which has a total sample of over 85,000 individuals, 
with over 400 respondents per region (NUTS 1 and 2). 
 
 
Correlations between the measures and variations at the sub-national and national 
levels 
 
We begin by looking at the correlation between the experienced-based and perception-based as-
sessments of public sector meritocracy (e.g. public sector employees relative to non-public sector 
employees). This is illustrated in Figure 2 below. The data show that the two measures are in strik-
ing agreement—of the 206 regional estimates, 197 fit within a 95% confidence interval, and the 
Spearman Rank coefficient is 0.75. This demonstrates that there seems to be a relatively well-
understood consensus about the extent to which success in the public sector is determined by merit 
versus connections/luck, irrespective of direct experience. 
  
Question: Success in Public Sector
(Hard work vs. Connections/luck)
Public sector employee Non-public sector employee
Aggregate to region Aggregate to region
Regional experience measure Regional perception measure
Aggregate to country Aggregate to country
(weight by reg. Population) (weight by reg. Population)
Country experience measure Country perception measure
  11 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCE VERSUS PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR MERI-
TOCRACY 
 
 
Comment: Figure 2 shows a comparison of the experienced-based and perception-based measures of meritocracy in the public 
sector on the regional level in Europe (NUTS 1 and 2 levels). 
 
 
If we instead use the national level indicators, which consist of the population weighted average of 
all regional scores in each country; the two measures are even more strongly correlated, with a 
Spearman Rank correlation coefficient of 0.89, with no apparent outliers (see Figure 3 below).  
 
We now move on to look at the spatial variation within Europe, with the help of our experienced 
measure on meritocracy. Overall, we find that there is significant variation in how public sector 
employees view the road to success in their field, yet respondents in the majority of European re-
gions tend to lean towards ‘”luck and connections” (as indicated by a score greater than “5”). We 
find that the regional scores range from 4.3 (South Midland, England) to 8.3 (Belgrade Region, 
Serbia). 
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FIGURE 3, EXPERIENCE VERSUS PERCEPTIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
 
Comment: The national level indicators are a population weighted average of all regional scores in each country, on experienced-
based and perception-based assessments of meritocracy in the public sector. The population data were taken from the most recent 
year available from Eurostat (2011).  
 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution by region in the sample (with the exception of Serbia and the 
Ukraine). Regions that are shaded lighter are considered more meritocratic. 
 
Taken together, we make two observations so far: first, the correlation between the experienced-
based and perception-based measures is high on the regional level and very high on the national 
level, and, second, there appears to be a large variation in some countries regarding how important 
merit is for success in the public sector across Europe on both the regional and national levels.   
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FIGURE 4, PUBLIC SECTOR MERITOCRACY IN 212 EUROPEAN REGIONS  
 
 
Comment: The distribution shown in the figure comes from the experienced-based measure on meritocracy. Regions that are 
shaded lighter are considered more meritocratic by public sector employees. 
 
 
Validity of the Meritocracy Measures on the National and Sub-
National levels 
 
As Adock and Collier note, “Measurement validity is specifically concerned with whether opera-
tionalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to meas-
ure” (Adock and Collier 2001: 529).  Although there are numerous ways in which validity can be 
assessed, we evaluate in this section what Adock and Collier (2001: 530) call ‘criterion validity’ (the 
extent to which our indicator relates to other, similar measures of our concept) and ‘construct validity’ 
(the extent to which our measure correlates with indicators of related concepts where we would 
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theoretically expect a relationship from the relevant literature), or what might broadly be referred to 
as ‘external validity’ by some scholars. 
 
The National Level 
 
In this section we compare the measures presented in the previous section with other measures of 
meritocracy in the public sector, as well as indicators of institutional quality such as measures of 
public sector impartiality, corruption and rule of law, along with several correlates that have been 
elucidated in the literature. Although we would not expect the measure in this study to correlate 
exactly with alternative measures (we rely on citizens, not experts, etc.), a strong correlation with 
other related factors and established measures would demonstrate that the meritocracy measure in 
this study actually captures the underlying concept in question. As already noted, most existing 
measures are on the national, and not on the sub-national, level. We therefore start with the nation-
al level, for which Table 1 provides the correlates3. 
 
  
                                                     
3
 Summary statistics and sources for data used throughout this section are found in Appendix 2 
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS WITH MERITOCRACY EXPERIENCE MEASURE 
 
  Meritocracy Experience 
    Pearson's P-value obs 
QoG Impartilaity 0.74 0.000 24 
QoG Professional 0.75 0.000 24 
QoG Closed -0.03 0.870 23 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 0.72 0.000 24 
Corruption (WGI) 0.78 0.000 24 
Corruption (CPI) 0.80 0.000 24 
Rule of Law (WGI) 0.77 0.000 24 
Judicial Independence (WEF) 0.83 0.000 24 
Property Rights (WEF) 0.86 0.000 24 
Human Development Index 0.62 0.013 24 
PPP per capita (WDI, logged) 0.58 0.002 24 
Income Inequality (Gini index) 0.12 0.59 23 
Gender Inequality (% women in lower house) 0.39 0.10 
24 
24  Gender Equality (economic rights, CIRI) 0.52 0.09 
Political Trust (WEF) 0.76 0.001 24 
 
Comment: Correlations reported with the merit experience indicator inverted (higher scores imply more meritocracy) in order to 
match the other variables. ‘WGI’ is World Governance Indicators; ‘CPI’ is Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, ‘WEF’ is the World Economic Forum, WDI is the World Development Indicators, and the three QoG measures come 
from Teorell, Dahlström and Dahlberg (2011). The data are taken from the QoG institute’s database (Teorell et al. 2013).   
 
 
Assessing the criterion validity of the measure with other measures of different ways of organizing 
the public sector (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012; Teorell and Rothstein 2012), we find that 
the citizen experience measure is highly correlated with two of the three dimensions (“impartiality” 
and “professionalism”) while it is unrelated to “closedness”. The “professionalism” index picks up 
the personnel side, including independence from politics, and meritocratic recruitment, and the 
“impartiality” index taps into neutral service delivery, while the “closedness” index measures the 
extent to which the bureaucracy is protected by, for example, special labor market laws. That the de 
facto measurement we are presenting here correlated with the two former but not with the latter is 
in fact exactly what one would expect, and underlines the point made earlier with reference to Ol-
sen (2005). It is also in line with observations of cases in Southern Europe, such as Spain and 
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Greece, with extensive protection for the bureaucracy, combined with high levels of politicization 
(Parrado 2000; Sotiropoulos 2004). 
 
In addition, we find that the correlations with similar indicators of institutional capacity, impartiali-
ty, rule of law and corruption are also in the expected direction, and fairly strong, with various 
measures of state capacity—corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. All correlate 
with our measure at 0.72 or higher, and the correlations are significant at the 99.9% level of confi-
dence.  
 
In testing for construct validity, the measures of economic and social development, such as the 
HDI and per capita income, are also significant in pairwise correlations. On the basis of previous 
research we would predict that a meritocratic public sector is one that is highly related with impar-
tiality—and thus more equal outcome across social groups on average—and we find that the meas-
ure is highly correlated with three measures of inequality (Henderson et al. 2007; Rauch and Evans 
2000). 
 
The two measures of gender inequality—political and economic—correlate at 0.38 and 0.52 respec-
tively. Finally, the measure presented here is strongly correlated with political trust, at 0.76, which is 
also expected (Rothstein 2011).4  The Gini index is in the expected direction, but non-significant, 
mostly due to several post-socialist countries, such as the Ukraine, Serbia and Slovakia, still having 
relatively low levels of income inequality (and low meritocracy) while England and Ireland demon-
strate the reverse pattern. 
 
  
                                                     
4
 In general, Turkey is an outlier in our sample, and its exclusion noticeably increases almost all correlations in Table 1.   
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FIGURE 5, EXPERT VERSUS CITIZEN MEASURES OF MERITOCRACY (IMPARTIALITY) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6, EXPERT VERSUS CITIZEN MEASURES OF MERITOCRACY (PROFESSIONALISM) 
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Figures 5 and 6 are graphs of our experienced-based measure with the “impartiality” and “profes-
sionalism” indices from the QoG expert survey data (Teorell, Dahlström and Dahlberg 2011) in-
cluded in Table 1. We highlight the two significant factors in the two above figures, whereby we 
find that our citizen-based, informal measure correlated remarkably strongly with the expert-based 
more formal rules measures.  Some outliers, such as Turkey and Croatia in Figure 5 and Ireland, 
Croatia and Turkey in Figure 6, warrant further investigation.   
 
All in all, the correlations on the national level are in the expected direction, showing a high degree 
of both criterion (with the QoG variables) and content (with the development, equality and trust 
variables) validity, and therefore strengthen our confidence in the measure presented here. 
 
The Sub-National Level 
 
Table 2 highlights simple pairwise correlations with outside measures that we would expect to cor-
relate with our measure of meritocracy on the sub-national level. Data availability at the sub-
national level is not as good as the national level, but we start with comparing the meritocracy 
measure with our index of regional-level quality of government from the EQI (Charron, Dijkstra 
and Lapuente 2014; 2015). The data are available in two rounds, 2010 and 2013 (the latter is based 
on the same survey as the meritocracy measure). 
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TABLE 2, SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL EXTERNAL VALIDITY CHECK 
 
  Meritocracy (citizen experience) 
    Pearson's P-value obs 
EQI 2010  0.72 0.000 189 
EQI 2013  0.60 0.000 206 
Petty Corruption 2010  -0.55 0.000 180 
Petty Corruption 2013 -0.56 0.000 212 
Impartiality 2010 0.56 0.000 180 
Impartiality 2013 0.54 0.000 206 
PPP Per capita 0.47 0.000 189 
Income Inequality (Theil) 0.29 0.000 187 
Gender Inequality (% women in regional parliament) 0.43 0.000 182 
% Poverty risk  0.21 0.006 181 
Economic Satisfaction 0.35 0.000 212 
Pop. Density (log) -0.23 0.001 189 
Capital region -0.17 0.011 212 
 
 
We find that the 2010 EQI correlates with our meritocracy measure at 0.72, while this is at 0.60 in 
2013. The drop in the strength of the correlation is due to the inclusion of the Turkish regions, 
which are ranked much higher on the meritocracy measure than the EQI. 
 
We then take two sub-components from the EQI—a measure of direct experience with corruption 
(reported petty corruption) and the perceived level of impartiality in several regional public services 
(education, health service, law enforcement). The correlations are negative as expected, relatively 
strong—between -0.54 and -0.56—and significant at the 99.9% level of confidence for both 2010 
and 2013.  
 
Next we look at the meritocracy measure in relation to other factors, again reported in Table 3, and 
find that PPP per capita, income inequality and the gender gap in political representation correlate 
at 0.47, 0.29 and 0.43, respectively. Capital regions are recorded as (slightly) less meritocratic on 
average. We also find that the aggregate levels of economic satisfaction (from the same survey) are 
correlated with meritocracy. Whether a region is autonomous and the size of the region (in terms of 
population density) is unrelated to the level of meritocracy, even when controlling for the level of 
PPP per capita.  
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In Figure 7, we highlight the bivariate relationship between our meritocracy measure and the past 
value of the EQI measure (from 2010), which are highly correlated, with a Spearman Rank measure 
of 0.71.  
 
FIGURE 7, MERITOCRACY AND THE EQI 2010 
 
 
Comment: The figure shows the correlation between the experienced-based meritocracy measure in the 2010 EQI (Charron, 
Lapuente and Rothstein 2013). 
 
 
In our view, the correlations presented here demonstrate strong external validity for the measure 
presented. Without exception, the new measurement correlates as expected with other measures on 
the sub-national level. 
 
 
Spatial Variations of Public Sector Meritocracy within Countries 
 
Next we examine the level of within-country variation in public sector meritocracy. Figure 8 shows 
the distribution of meritocracy scores for each country in rank order (triangles) with all respective 
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regional estimates around the country estimates (circles). The regional data are not centered in any 
way, and thus we see that the country context is highly salient in the assessments of meritocracy on 
which we base our measure, as the regional distribution is far from random. However, it does ap-
pear that, in several cases, the regional distribution is highly relevant and worth further exploration.   
 
FIGURE 8, WITHIN-COUNTY VARIATION IN MERITOCRACY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
 
Comment: The figure shows the distribution of meritocracy scores for each country in rank order (triangles) with all respective 
regional estimates around the country estimates (circles). 
 
 
To compare the extent to which regional estimates vary in a country, we calculate a population 
weighted regional Gini index measure for each country, in which lower scores indicate less regional 
variation. Figure 9 shows the results. We see that Serbia (which includes Kosovo), Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Italy and Turkey demonstrate the widest regional variation, while regions in Belgium, Greece, 
Hungary, Finland and Denmark are much more evenly distributed.   
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FIGURE 9, POPULATION WEIGHTED WITHIN-COUNTRY VARIATION INDEX IN MERITOCRACY 
 
 
Comment: The figure presents a population weighted regional Gini index measure for each country, in which lower scores indicate 
less regional variation. Country abbreviations are given in Appendix 1. 
 
 
To further explore the validity of the measure presented here, we would like to make sure that the 
variation is meaningful, and not only random. The question is thus what factors could explain why 
citizens in certain regions of some countries assess public sector meritocracy so differently, while, 
in other cases, there are relatively small spatial variations, and the within-country variation in the 
measure presented here correlates with the explanations in an expected way. For this, we rely on 
several explanations from the literature on regional inequalities in wealth within countries.   
 
Scholars of a host of disciplines have been interested in the question of regional inequality for dec-
ades, and empirical and theoretical analyses focusing on regional inequalities began many years ago 
(Myrdal 1957; Williamson 1865). Moreover, it should be stressed that the literature on differences 
in economic divergences between countries is theoretically and empirically distinct from that on 
regional divergences within them. While space does not permit an entirely compressive review of 
this literature, we summarize several relevant strands in this section. 
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First, building on Kuznet’s (1955) curve hypothesis, the neoclassical explanations postulate that 
regional divergence/convergence is a natural function of a country’s development.  Scholarship in 
this model tends to stress the non-linear bell curve pattern of regional inequalities, highlighting fac-
tors such as competitive advantage and constant returns to scale as key mechanisms behind chang-
es in regional inequalities. The essence of the theory here implies a non-linear inverted U-shaped 
relationship—that regional inequalities are small at low levels of development (all regions are more 
or less equally poor), then, at moderate levels of development, regional divergence occurs, while, at 
high levels of development, regions are more harmonized.   
 
Second, while some studies show the benefits of increases in trade for overall growth (Dollar 1992; 
Frankel and Romer 1999), other scholars have posited that one consequence is that which is posi-
tively linked with regional inequality.  Based on the work of Krugman (1991), several studies have 
developed models of the “New Economic Geography” (NEG), which elucidates the effects of how 
globalization and openness to trade produce tensions for regional balances, via centrifugal and cen-
tripetal forces. Thus we would expect divergences in the spatial distribution of meritocracy across 
regions within countries to be related to the level of economic openness at the country level.  
 
Third, political institutions, such as the extent to which a country is decentralized, could allow for 
regional variations in public sector practices that would impact the level of meritocracy—although 
the literature and empirical evidence are largely divided on this point. For example, Prud'homme 
(1995) argues that the greater the level of decentralization in the public sector, the less power the 
central government has to harmonize levels of development among its regions via redistribution. 
Regions that are more endowed with human capital, natural resources or beneficial geographic 
positions are more likely to grow faster than less endowed regions when a country decentralizes, at 
least in the short to medium run. We thus look at the level of political and fiscal centralization 
compared with the spatial distribution of meritocracy.   
 
Fourth, and finally, one of the cornerstone policies of the EU is regional cohesion—and thus coun-
tries and regions that have been member states for a longer period of time may have benefited 
from the numerous public sector investments made by the Commission to aid less developed re-
gions in catching up. We would thus expect that time as an EU member would be negatively corre-
lated with the level of regional variation in meritocracy.  
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TABLE 3, CORRELATES OF SUB-NATIONAL VARIATION IN PUBLIC SECTOR MERITOCRACY 
 
    Pearson's P-value obs 
PPP per capita (log) -0.49 0.010 24 
Income Inequality (GINI) 0.03 0.890 24 
Rule of Law (WGI) -0.48 0.011 24 
Corruption (CPI) -0.39 0.060 24 
Impartial Bureaucracy (QoG) -0.44 0.033 24 
Economic Openness (KOF) -0.52 0.010 22 
Decentralization (RAI) -0.11 0.640 22 
Yrs. EU Membership -0.43 0.038 24 
Population (log) 0.00 0.970 24 
Unemployment % (WDI) 0.29 0.190 22 
Comment: The Ukraine, with only six of 24 regions, is not included in the analysis. 
 
 
Table 3 shows bivariate correlations based on these various hypotheses. We find that, despite a 
relatively small number of observations, that spatial variation in public sector meritocracy within 
countries is related to the level of economic development and to several governance measures, 
including rule of law, corruption perceptions and the overall level of impartiality in the public sec-
tor. We find also that economic openness is negatively correlated with regional inequalities, which is 
probably due to the fact that all countries in the sample are mid to highly developed. Thus we see 
only the right side of a somewhat inverted U-shaped curve, with Ukraine standing out as an outlier. 
Length of membership in the EU is significant at the 04% level of confidence, which possibly sug-
gests the effect of convergence policy harmonizing regions within countries.  Population, unem-
ployment and decentralization appear to have no relation with spatial differences in public sector 
meritocracy.   
 
We highlight the bivariate relationship between the regional variation in meritocracy and economic 
development in Figure 10. 
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FIGURE 10, VARIANCE IN MERITOCRACY AND PPP PER CAPITA (LOG) 
 
 
 
 
Although it would be premature to draw any conclusions on the explanatory power of any of the 
hypotheses presented in this section, based only on bivariate correlations, we think that it is en-
couraging that the within-country variation seems to fit existing theories fairly well. Again this 
speaks for the validity of the experienced-based measure of meritocracy presented here.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has proposed a novel measure of meritocracy in the public sector that complements 
existing measures (Dahlström et al. 2015; Evans and Rauch 1999; Teorell, Dahlström and Dahlberg 
2011). From a recent survey (2013) of over 85,000 citizens in 24 European countries, we create two 
measures of the extent to which public sector employees think success in the public sector is based 
on merit, or on connections and luck. The first measure presented in this paper is an experience-
based measure of meritocracy and, to our knowledge, the first of its kind. We also present a percep-
tion-based measure. Both these measures are contrary to previous studies available on the sub-
national level, as the survey offers a sample of over 400 respondents in 212 regions (NUTS 1 and 
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NUTS 2 level) in the 24 countries included.  Both are listed fully by region and country in Appen-
dix 1, free for scholarly use. 
The purpose of this paper has been to present and validate the data, and we think we can draw 
three conclusions from the analysis. First, after an external and internal validation that consistently 
points in the expected direction, we think that the measure presented there actually captures the de 
facto meritocracy in the public sector. Second, we conclude that regions within countries vary in 
terms of meritocracy in the public sector to a fairly large extent. Third, we conduct a very prelimi-
nary analysis of why there are regional differences, looking only at bivariate correlations. We find 
that, despite a relatively small number of observations, spatial variation in public sector meritocracy 
within countries is related to level of economic development, and to several ‘governance’ measures, 
including rule of law, corruption perceptions and the overall level of impartiality in the public sec-
tor. And, at least weakly, it is related to the length of membership in the EU, while population, 
unemployment and decentralization appear to have no relation with spatial differences in public 
sector meritocracy.  
 
Taken together, we think that the measure presented holds water and that the regional differences 
merit more thorough investigations.  
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Appendix 1: Sample and full data by country and region 
 
 
TABLE A1, COUNTRY DATA, ABBREVIATIONS AND NUTS LEVEL 
 
country NUTS code regional NUTS level 
Merit Experi-
ence 
Merit Percept-
ions 
Austria AT 2 5.685 5.515 
Belgium BE 1 6.058 6.332 
Bulgaria BG 2 6.902 7.794 
Croatia HR 1 7.279 7.383 
Czech Republic CZ 2 6.410 6.746 
Denmark DK 2 5.292 5.672 
Finland FI 2 5.256 5.931 
France  FR 1 5.587 5.943 
Germany DE 2 5.384 5.522 
Greece GR 1 6.772 7.688 
Hungary HU 2 6.442 6.469 
Ireland IE 2 5.963 6.021 
Italy IT 2 6.236 6.904 
Netherlands NL 2 5.727 6.101 
Poland PL 2 6.623 6.894 
Portugal PT 2 6.268 7.217 
Romania RO 2 6.348 7.091 
Serbia RS 2 7.330 7.454 
Slovakia SK 1 7.240 7.355 
Spain ES 2 5.796 6.580 
Sweden SE 2 5.471 5.704 
Turkey TR 1 5.334 5.032 
Ukraine UA 2 6.937 6.879 
United Kingdom UK 1 5.071 5.654 
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TABLE A2, REGIONAL DATA 
 
NUTS code name Merit Experience exp_se Merit Perceptions per_se 
AT11 Burgenland 5.222 0.447 5.497 0.134 
AT12 Niederöstrerreich 5.897 0.375 5.592 0.157 
AT13 Wien 6.088 0.348 5.544 0.140 
AT21 Kärnten 5.868 0.493 5.384 0.144 
AT22 Steiermark 5.605 0.395 5.511 0.146 
AT31 Oberösterreich 5.681 0.437 5.768 0.135 
AT32 Salzburg 5.310 0.450 5.411 0.134 
AT33 Tirol 5.058 0.321 5.156 0.123 
AT34 Voralberg 5.000 0.470 5.129 0.121 
be1 Brussels 6.023 0.292 6.287 0.153 
be2 Vlaams Gewest 5.983 0.338 6.208 0.146 
be3 Wallonie 6.203 0.340 6.567 0.145 
BG31 Severozapaden 7.788 0.340 8.315 0.167 
BG32 Severen Tsentralen 7.374 0.333 8.248 0.163 
BG33 Severoiztochen 6.202 0.358 6.741 0.171 
BG34 Yugoiztochen 6.654 0.305 7.296 0.150 
BG41 Yugozapaden 7.469 0.444 8.087 0.147 
BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen 5.942 0.413 7.845 0.154 
CZ01 Praha 7.050 0.321 6.864 0.166 
CZ02 Stredni Cechy 6.413 0.304 6.562 0.178 
CZ03 Jihozapad 6.787 0.343 6.920 0.162 
CZ04 Severozapad 6.447 0.309 6.752 0.173 
CZ05 Severovychod 6.345 0.326 6.932 0.183 
CZ06 Jihovychod 5.620 0.349 6.497 0.178 
CZ07 Stedni Morava 6.632 0.342 6.748 0.173 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko 6.289 0.351 6.745 0.175 
de1 Baden Wuttemberg 5.083 0.278 5.652 0.148 
de2 Bavaria 5.408 0.365 5.357 0.163 
de3 Berlin 5.322 0.380 5.510 0.143 
de4 Brandenburg 5.627 0.311 5.845 0.160 
de5 Bremen 5.375 0.392 5.358 0.133 
de6 Hamburg 4.821 0.386 5.407 0.135 
de7 Hessen 5.236 0.324 5.418 0.141 
de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 6.172 0.337 5.964 0.148 
de9 Lower Saxony 5.145 0.309 5.421 0.148 
dea North Rhine Westphalia 5.432 0.344 5.418 0.153 
deb Rhineland-Palatinate 5.563 0.303 5.500 0.148 
dec Saarland 5.945 0.312 5.569 0.153 
  33 
ded Saxony 5.561 0.389 5.510 0.144 
dee Saxony-Anhalt 5.569 0.418 6.161 0.143 
def Schleswig-Holstein 5.346 0.285 5.421 0.152 
deg Thuringia 6.152 0.378 6.225 0.157 
DK01 Hovedstaden 5.114 0.233 5.529 0.142 
DK02 Sjaelland 5.570 0.230 5.698 0.150 
DK03 Syddanmark 5.424 0.262 5.739 0.148 
DK04 Midtylland 5.179 0.233 5.739 0.145 
DK05 Nordjylland 5.378 0.199 5.767 0.159 
ES11 Galicia 5.426 0.458 6.709 0.161 
ES12 Principado de Asturias 5.366 0.455 6.484 0.158 
ES13 Cantabria 5.460 0.412 6.742 0.159 
ES21 Pais Vasco 5.091 0.399 6.385 0.162 
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 5.038 0.378 6.320 0.157 
ES23 La Rioja 5.978 0.394 6.485 0.157 
ES24 Aragón 5.264 0.389 6.544 0.151 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 5.833 0.450 6.366 0.161 
ES41 Castilla y León 5.308 0.401 6.454 0.167 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 5.885 0.419 6.595 0.165 
ES43 Extremadura 5.594 0.357 6.394 0.170 
ES51 Cataluña 5.978 0.404 6.859 0.153 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 6.102 0.444 6.538 0.166 
ES53 Illes Balears 4.860 0.337 6.703 0.161 
ES61 Andalucia 6.276 0.376 6.751 0.162 
ES62 Región de Murcia 5.053 0.367 5.991 0.165 
ES70 Canarias (ES) 6.091 0.419 6.393 0.172 
fi13 Itä-Suomi 5.053 0.336 6.135 0.158 
fi18 Etelä-Suomi 5.353 0.289 5.948 0.166 
fi19 Länsi-Suomi 5.118 0.304 5.800 0.163 
fi1a Pohjois-Suomi 5.367 0.283 5.986 0.157 
fi20 Åland 4.879 0.226 4.641 0.159 
FR10 Ile-de-France 5.595 0.322 6.079 0.151 
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 5.872 0.304 5.895 0.154 
FR22 Picardie 5.244 0.280 5.836 0.163 
FR23 Haute-Normandie 5.314 0.291 5.760 0.159 
FR24 Centre 5.245 0.279 5.739 0.162 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 5.472 0.334 5.870 0.142 
FR26 Bourgogne 5.830 0.293 5.684 0.156 
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 5.436 0.279 6.089 0.151 
FR41 Lorraine 5.553 0.332 5.740 0.154 
FR42 Alsace 5.525 0.316 6.154 0.143 
  34 
FR43 Franche-Comte 4.867 0.306 6.061 0.155 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 5.968 0.339 5.856 0.143 
FR52 Bretagne 5.413 0.309 5.467 0.148 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 5.028 0.312 5.842 0.158 
FR61 Aquitaine 5.956 0.280 6.248 0.143 
FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 5.776 0.316 5.917 0.152 
FR63 Limousin 5.453 0.268 6.079 0.147 
FR71 Rhone-Alpes 5.397 0.340 6.055 0.146 
FR72 Auvergne 5.549 0.300 5.937 0.149 
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 5.750 0.308 5.829 0.155 
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 6.000 0.344 5.940 0.155 
FR83 Corse 6.165 0.293 6.415 0.158 
FR91 Guadeloupe 5.805 0.281 5.977 0.165 
FR92 Martinique 5.708 0.295 5.919 0.176 
FR93 Guyane 6.145 0.210 6.084 0.192 
FR94 Reunion 5.371 0.283 5.746 0.173 
gr1 Voreia Ellada 6.792 0.361 7.607 0.148 
gr2 Kentriki Ellada 6.509 0.385 7.330 0.154 
gr3 Attica 6.881 0.454 7.969 0.136 
gr4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti 6.887 0.384 7.709 0.145 
HR03 Jadranska 7.627 0.315 7.436 0.165 
HR04 Kontinent 7.107 0.349 7.356 0.169 
hu1 Közép-Magyarország 6.242 0.365 6.562 0.169 
hu2 Dunántúl 6.630 0.330 6.503 0.174 
hu3 Észak és Alföld 6.446 0.375 6.375 0.173 
ie01 Border, Midland and Western 5.259 0.396 5.870 0.168 
ie02 Southern and Eastern 6.224 0.390 6.076 0.163 
ITC1 Piemonte 6.061 0.584 6.882 0.164 
ITC2 Valle d'Acosta 5.115 0.423 6.410 0.175 
ITC3 Ligura 6.273 0.530 6.789 0.172 
ITC4 Lombardia 6.313 0.659 6.879 0.169 
ITD1 Bolzano 5.988 0.345 5.968 0.187 
ITD2 Trento 5.368 0.359 6.053 0.185 
ITD3 Veneto 5.881 0.534 6.961 0.163 
ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 5.689 0.434 6.552 0.172 
ITD5 Emilia-Romagna 5.231 0.443 6.736 0.173 
ITE1 Toscana 5.738 0.564 6.799 0.166 
ITE2 Umbria 7.125 0.469 7.048 0.164 
ITE3 Marche 6.510 0.485 7.213 0.159 
ITE4 Lazio 6.545 0.433 7.064 0.170 
ITF1 Abruzzo 6.118 0.401 7.355 0.166 
  35 
ITF2 Molise 6.985 0.378 7.208 0.175 
ITF3 Campania 6.768 0.363 6.768 0.183 
ITF4 Puglia 6.088 0.414 7.097 0.169 
ITF5 Basilicata 6.317 0.427 6.991 0.171 
ITF6 Calabria 6.358 0.419 6.943 0.179 
ITG1 Sicilia 6.829 0.388 7.124 0.177 
ITG2 Sardegna 7.071 0.392 7.206 0.169 
nl11 Groningen 5.352 0.282 5.938 0.195 
nl12 Friesland (NL) 5.181 0.257 5.927 0.200 
nl13 Drenthe 5.752 0.311 5.816 0.189 
nl21 Overijssel 5.857 0.270 6.313 0.189 
nl22 Gelderland 5.860 0.293 6.411 0.178 
nl23 Flevoland 5.573 0.302 6.073 0.187 
nl31 Utrecht 5.540 0.254 5.963 0.192 
nl32 Noord-Holland 5.307 0.290 6.084 0.190 
nl33 Zuid-Holland 6.141 0.290 6.072 0.197 
nl34 Zeeland 5.839 0.297 6.242 0.186 
nl41 Noord-Brabant 5.621 0.278 5.836 0.186 
nl42 Limburg (NL) 6.007 0.285 6.465 0.196 
PL11 Lodzkie 7.078 0.338 6.826 0.172 
PL12 Mazowieckie 6.842 0.363 7.127 0.173 
PL21 Malopolskie 6.378 0.300 6.629 0.180 
PL22 Slaskie 6.634 0.329 7.042 0.170 
PL31 Lubelskie 6.566 0.356 6.866 0.168 
PL32 Podkarpackie 6.375 0.350 6.818 0.175 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie 7.105 0.290 6.906 0.180 
PL34 Podlaskie 6.105 0.336 6.545 0.180 
PL41 Wielkopolskie 6.123 0.367 6.883 0.172 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 6.843 0.301 6.914 0.179 
PL43 Lubuskie 6.562 0.331 6.997 0.172 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie 6.933 0.301 7.201 0.169 
PL52 Opolskie 6.838 0.318 6.426 0.182 
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 6.368 0.332 6.892 0.172 
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie 6.766 0.366 6.457 0.178 
PL63 Pomorskie 6.493 0.339 6.844 0.165 
PT11 Norte 6.420 0.490 7.480 0.144 
PT15 Algarve 7.171 0.315 6.686 0.152 
PT16 Centro 6.129 0.368 7.340 0.142 
PT17 Lisboa 6.067 0.478 7.005 0.146 
PT18 Alentejo 6.328 0.367 6.707 0.153 
PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores 6.508 0.407 7.026 0.158 
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PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira 5.605 0.372 7.119 0.169 
RO11 Nord-Vest 6.792 0.389 7.166 0.183 
RO12 Centru 6.020 0.505 7.095 0.179 
RO21 Nord-Est 5.716 0.395 7.147 0.192 
RO22 Sud-Est 5.692 0.455 7.192 0.174 
RO31 Sud-Muntenia 6.679 0.433 6.639 0.186 
RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov 7.526 0.522 7.406 0.169 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 6.283 0.356 7.156 0.190 
RO42 Vest 6.459 0.451 7.056 0.177 
SE1 Östra Sverige 5.181 0.232 5.740 0.127 
SE2 Södra Sverige 5.706 0.206 5.621 0.126 
SE3 Norra Sverige 5.517 0.220 5.822 0.143 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj 7.439 0.350 7.308 0.139 
SK02 Západné Slovensko 7.515 0.315 7.261 0.152 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko 6.726 0.353 7.568 0.156 
SK04 Východné Slovensko 7.276 0.353 7.304 0.161 
ukc Northeast England 4.885 0.383 5.282 0.161 
ukd Northwest England 5.161 0.379 5.799 0.155 
uke Yorkshire-Humber 5.102 0.322 5.706 0.167 
ukf East Midland England 4.948 0.363 6.033 0.158 
ukg West Midland England 5.410 0.363 5.503 0.153 
ukh East of England 5.236 0.373 5.405 0.163 
uki London 5.200 0.345 5.550 0.168 
ukj South East England 4.810 0.329 5.559 0.161 
ukk South West England 4.438 0.376 5.926 0.165 
ukl Wales 5.333 0.436 5.957 0.162 
ukm Scotland 5.204 0.438 5.559 0.161 
ukn N. Ireland 5.343 0.387 5.642 0.150 
RS11 Belgrade 8.393 0.329 8.052 0.160 
RS21 Šumadija and Western Serbia 7.367 0.374 7.581 0.166 
RS22 Vojvodina 7.929 0.426 7.442 0.173 
RS22 Southern and Eastern Serbia 6.939 0.400 7.867 0.159 
RS23 Kosovo and Metohija 5.875 0.651 6.273 0.213 
TR1 Istanbul 5.667 0.594 5.520 0.162 
TR2 Bati Marmara 5.326 0.484 5.234 0.181 
TR3 Ege 5.111 0.433 4.436 0.178 
TR4 Dogu Marmara 5.521 0.388 4.943 0.169 
TR5 Bati Anadolu 5.367 0.317 5.572 0.161 
TR6 Akdeniz 4.927 0.567 5.003 0.177 
TR7 Orta Anadolu 5.655 0.315 5.292 0.151 
TR8 Bati Karadeniz 6.226 0.647 5.433 0.166 
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TR9 Dogu Karadeniz 4.643 0.505 4.194 0.154 
TRA Kuzeydogu Anadolu 4.595 0.409 4.881 0.150 
TRB Ortadogu Anadolu 4.860 0.440 5.169 0.155 
TRC Güneydogu Anadolu 5.333 0.623 4.369 0.175 
UA13 Kharkov 6.677 0.354 7.132 0.198 
UA15 Zakarpatt 7.480 0.307 6.881 0.189 
UA21 Odessa 6.922 0.320 6.556 0.207 
UA25 Crimea 6.462 0.396 6.401 0.194 
UA4 Kiev 7.169 0.339 7.521 0.167 
UA7 Lviv 6.892 0.340 7.255 0.194 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics and data sources 
 
varianble Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max source  
National level        
Meritocracy experience 
24 6.14 0.70 5.07 7.33 Author  
Meritocracy perceptions 
24 6.49 0.78 5.03 7.79 Author  
Impartiality (QoG) 24 0.27 0.64 -0.82 1.21 Dahlström et al. 2015 
Profesionalism (Qog) 24 4.31 0.92 2.58 6.32 Dahlström et al. 2015 
Closed (Qog) 23 5.23 0.69 3.97 6.29 Dahlström et al. 2015 
Gov effectiveness  24 0.98 0.79 -0.75 2.25 World Governance Indicators 
Corruption 24 0.83 1.00 -0.98 2.41 World Governance Indicators 
Corruption 24 5.91 2.17 2.40 9.30 Transparancy International (CPI) 
Rule of Law 24 0.94 0.83 -0.81 1.98 World Governance Indicators 
Judicial Independence 24 4.38 1.46 2.44 6.49 World Economic Forum 
Property rights 24 4.77 1.06 2.73 6.45 World Economic Forum 
Human Development Index 24 0.84 0.06 0.73 0.90 United Nations 
PPP per capita (log) 24 11.30 6.80 7.59 42.70 
World Development Indicators 
Gini index 24 31.57 4.30 25.00 39.00 
World Development Indicators 
% women in parliament 23 19.31 10.64 4.20 42.70 Teorell et al. 2013 
Women eocnomic equality 24 2.25 0.85 1.00 3.00 Cingareli and Richards 2013 
political trust 24 2.97 1.22 1.54 5.47 World Economic Forum 
Regional Level        
Meritocracy experience 
212 5.95 0.74 4.44 8.39 Author  
Meritocracy perceptions 
212 6.34 0.77 4.19 8.31 Author  
EQI 2010 189 0.20 0.99 -2.72 1.90 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2014) 
EQI 2013 206 0.06 1.05 -2.66 2.78 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2015) 
Petty corruption (2010, %) 180 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.36 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2014) 
Petty corruption (2013, %) 212 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.43 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2015) 
Impartialty (2010, EQI) 180 0.05 1.01 -2.58 2.04 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2014) 
Impartialty (2013, EQI) 206 0.00 0.87 -2.41 2.38 
Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2015) 
PPPp.c. (2011, log) 
189 10.00 0.39 8.88 10.93 Eurostat  
Wage Inequality (2010) 
187 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Galbraith and Garcilazo (2005) 
% women parl 
189 27.60 8.19 10.00 44.97 
Sundström (2013) 
poverty risk (%) 181 16.17 6.71 4.90 38.40 Eurostat  
pop. Density (logged) 189 2.50 1.65 -0.02 8.49 Eurostat  
capital region 212 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 Author  
 
 
